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Description
Background of the Invention
Field of the Invention
[0001] The invention concerns information security generally and is more speciﬁcally concerned with transactions in
which a third party approves the transaction.
Description of the Prior Art
[0002] As computing and data storage become less expensive, it becomes easier to assemble the information which
an individual reveals about himself when he enters into transactions and to use the assembled information in ways
which invade the individual's privacy. It is particularly easy to assemble such information when the transactions involve
a third party. For example, a credit card company or bank can use the information it acquires in the course of credit- or
bank card transactions made by a customer to determine the spending habits of a customer and can then either use
that information in its own business or make it available to others. The consequences of the availability of information
about an individual's spending habits range from the annoying to the serious. At a minimum, the individual receives
more targeted junk mail than he or she otherwise might; more seriously, the same information that is used to target the
individual for junk mail can be used to target the individual for private or governmental harassment. Thus, at some point,
the ability to collect information about an individual reduces the individual's willingness to deviate from the norm and
thus has a chilling effect on his exercise of his rights.
[0003] One way an individual can avoid this problem is to pay for everything in cash, since nothing on a bank note
indicates who its owner is or was. This same property, however, makes cash both easy to lose and a tempting target for
criminals. For both these reasons, few people desire to carry a large amount of cash. One way of solving this difﬁculty
is to use electronic cash, as described in David Chaum, "Security without Identiﬁcation: Transaction Systems to make
Big Brother Obsolete", Communications of the ACM, vol. 28, no. 10, pp. 1030-144, Oct. 1985. When electronic cash is
used in an automated transaction, a purchase cannot be associated with a customer. The scheme, however, may be
insecure against fraud; see Steven H. Low, et al., "Collusion in a Multi-Party Communications Protocol for Anonymous
Credit Cards," submitted to IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. In addition, since the electronic cash is given to a
customer, a means is needed to prevent the individual from duplicating and spending it over and over again.
[0004] Protocols are also known for performing payment transactions between mutually distrustful parties over an
insecure network. See Semyon Dukach. "SNPP: A Simple Network Payment Protocol", in Proceedings of the Computer
Security Applications Conference, San Antonio, TX, November, 1992. However, these protocols do not prevent parties
involved in a transaction from compiling information about purchase habits.
[0005] Another approach is to simply not transmit information to certain parties. For example, European Patent Appli-
cation 0 501 697, "Mediation of transactions in a communications system", discloses a method and system for mediat-
ing transactions among several parties, in which information may be hidden from certain parties. Information to be
hidden is received by the transaction manager, but may be hidden from a party by the transaction manager not trans-
mitting the information to that party.
[0006] Likewise, European Patent Application 0 399 850, "Anonymous matching system", discloses an automatic bid
matching system for trading instruments, in which only the matching information that is required by a station is transmit-
ted to that station.
[0007] While these systems hide some information from some parties, they both require a central system which has
access to all the information and which hides information by not transmitting the information to certain parties.
[0008] What is needed is a way of performing transactions which has the convenience and safety of credit card trans-
actions and the anonymity of cash transactions. It is an object of the invention to provide such a technique, and thereby
to overcome major disadvantages of present-day credit card and cash transactions.
Summary of the Invention
[0009] Anonymity is achieved in the credit card transactions of the invention by encrypting the messages required for
the transaction such that the involved parties can read only the information required for their parts in the transaction and
by sending the messages by means of a communicative exchange, so that a party receiving a message does not know
the source of the message. For example, only the communications exchange can read the destinations of the mes-
sages, while the only information the credit-giving bank can read is the identity of the customer and the amount of the
purchase. The protocols used in the credit card transactions of the invention further ensure that the anonymity is main-
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principles of the invention are further not limited to credit card transactions, but may be employed in any situation where
a party to a transaction wishes to restrict another party from getting more than the minimum amount of information
required for the party to participate in the transaction.
[0010] The invention provides a method of making a transaction, and a method of automatically authenticating a ﬁrst
party to a second party, as deﬁned in the accompanying claims.
[0011] Other objects and advantages of the apparatus and methods disclosed herein will be apparent to those of ordi-
nary skill in the art upon perusal of the following Drawing and Detailed Description, wherein:
Brief Description of the Drawing
[0012]
FIG. 1 is a summary of the public key cryptography techniques employed in the invention.
FIG. 2 is an overview of a preferred embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 3 is a table of the message formats used in the invention;
FIG. 4 is a diagram of a veriﬁcation technique employed in a preferred embodiment; and
FIG. 5 is a diagram of a simpliﬁed preferred embodiment of the invention.
[0013] Reference numbers in the Drawing have two parts: the two least-signiﬁcant digits are the number of an item in
a ﬁgure; the remaining digits are the number of the ﬁgure in which the item ﬁrst appears. Thus, an item with the refer-
ence number 201 ﬁrst appears in FIG. 2.
Detailed Description of a Preferred Embodiment
[0014] The following Detailed Description begins with a discussion of the cryptographic techniques employed in the
invention, continues with an overview of the invention, then gives a detailed description of the protocol used in a pre-
ferred embodiment, and concludes with a discussion of collusion and with a description of a simpliﬁed implementation
of the protocol.
Cryptographic Techniques: FIG. 1
[0015] Our protocol makes essential use of two well-known public-key cryptographic tools, public-key encryption
EA(msg) and signature SgnA(msg). As shown in FIG. 1, in a system using the tools, each party A that wishes to com-
municate has a key pair. One of the pair, called the public key 103, is made public, and the other, called the secret key
101, is known only to A. To ensure secrecy of communication one sends EA(msg) to A, which is the message msg
encrypted with A's public key 103 so that only A can decrypt it (with its secret key). To sign a message msg A generates
SgnA(msg), which is a copy of msg followed by the encryption of msg with A's secret key 101, so that everyone with
A's public key 103 can verify the signature but only A could have produced it. Each party in our system has a public key
103 and a secret key 101; the public key 103 is known to all of the other parties, but the secret key 101 is known only
to its owner.
Overview of the Invention: FIG. 2
[0016] FIG. 2 shows the participants in an anonymous credit card transaction and the messages which ﬂow between
the participants in the course of the transaction. The participants are indicated by circles and messages are indicated
by arrows which point from the source of the message to the destination of the message. Information which a partici-
pant must maintain during the transaction is indicated by boxes within the circle representing the participant. It should
be pointed out at this point that a credit card transaction is to be considered herein as any kind of transaction where
completion of the transaction is dependent on approval by a third party.
[0017] To protect privacy, a customer C 231 maintains accounts at two different banks Bc 203 and Bp 213. Bank Bc
203 issues the anonymous credit card and knows the identity 232 of C 231. Bank Bp 213 only manages money or cred-
its that have been deposited in the account. Since it does not extend credit, bank Bp 213 knows customer 231 only by
the pseudonym P 234. In the following, we will use P and C interchangeably to refer to customer 231.
[0018] At the beginning of a billing period, bank Bc 203 places credits in P's account (Bp, P) at Bp 213 (arrows 211,
223). To use these credits to make purchases at a store S 245, P 234 requests bank Bp to transfer funds from account
(Bp, P) to the store's account (Bs, S) at possibly another bank Bs 237 (arrows 225, 239). Bs 237 then notiﬁes store S
245, which releases the merchandise to P (arrow 243). At the end of a billing period, Bp 213 presents bank Bc 203 with
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231 pays the bill, Bc 203 places additional credits in (Bp, P) 217 (arrows 211, 223).
[0019] The key idea is to use cryptographic techniques to enable 1) banks Bc and Bp to communicate without knowing
each other or the account for which the transaction is destined; and 2) bank Bp to transfer funds to Bs without knowing
each other. This is done with the aid of an intermediary for all communications, which we call the communication
exchange cx 227. To achieve criterion 1, C 231 stores the encrypted address
205 at bank Bc 203. Here,
is the account owner P encrypted with bank Bp's public key 103, and Ecx(Bp,
..) is the destination bank Bp 213 (and
account owner) encrypted with cx's public key 103. To place credits in (Bp, P) 217, Bc 203 sends a message 247
together with the encrypted destination
205 to cx 227; cx determines, and forwards the message to, the destination bank Bp; only Bp can determine the desti-
nation account. Note that P is hidden from cx, and both Bp and P are hidden from Bc. A similar technique is used for
sending a billing statement from Bp to Bc without one knowing the other. To achieve criterion 2, Bp is given by the cus-
tomer P at the store the encrypted address
219, and uses it to transfer funds to (Bs, S) in a similar way. In the preferred embodiment, the information required for
messages 233 and 234 is obtained from two sources: C 231's credit card, which contains a speciﬁcation of Bp 213
which cx 227 can read and P 234, and a credit card purchase device at S 245, which contains a speciﬁcation of Bs 237
which cx 227 can read and a speciﬁcation of (Bs, S) which Bs 237 can read. This information, plus the amount of the
proposed purchase, makes up message 233, which is sent by the credit card purchase device to cx 227.
[0020] Besides transferring messages between the parties to the transaction, cx 227 acts as a central bank. cx 227
keeps an account 229(a..n) for every bank. A fund transfer from a bank to another bank is recorded in their accounts
229 at cx 227. This is possible since cx 227 knows the source and destination banks for all fund transfers. Periodically,
the accounts are settled up. When an imbalance occurs in the funds of a bank, cx 227 requests assets from the bank
or sends assets to the bank. Since banks do not have to transfer assets directly among themselves, they need not know
each other's identity. All transfers are signed and logged by cx 227 in message log 228 to provide an audit trail if a dis-
pute arises. In another embodiment, there may be a central bank which is separate from cx 227; in such an embodi-
ment, cx 227 would send the central bank the messages required for the funds transfers between the participating
banks.
[0021] Since all fund transfers take place electronically between banks, the bits representing money are never in the
possession of individuals, who may otherwise duplicate and spend these bits over and over again.
Notations: FIG. 3
[0022] The protocol is executed by the players C, Bc, P, Bp, S, Bs, and cx. It uses two well-known public-key crypto-
graphic tools ç public-key encryption EA(msg) and signature SgnA(msg). The message msg is always appended with
a random number before every encryption; e.g.
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This prevents a player that has all the information in the message but not the message itself from computing the
encrypted version EA(msg).
[0023] The communication from a source src to a destination dst is accomplished by a message pair m1(src, dst)
and m2(src, dst). A source src, or a destination dst, is one of C, Bc, P, Bp, S, and Bs. Four types of message formats
are summarized in FIG. 3:
• m1(src, dst) is sent by src to cx and is formatted in F(msg, dst) 303 or Fsrc(msg, dst) 305;
• m2(src, dst) is sent by cx to dst and is formatted in X(msg, dst) 307 or Xsrc(msg, dst) 309.
[0024] Also deﬁned in the table is the encrypted address for anonymous communications. C stores De(Bp, P) 311 at
Bc to allow Bc to place credits into account (Bp, P) without knowing Bp or P, and stores D
e(Bc, C) at Bp to allow Bp to
send bills for account (Bc, C) without knowing Bc or C. During a purchase, P provides Bp with D
e(Bs,S) to allow Bp to
transfer funds into store's account without knowing Bs or S.
[0025] Finally, Ep(msg) in the protocol is a message m encrypted with P's public key. It is used by P to store infor-
mation at Bp that only P can decrypt. For additional security, Bp may ask the customer questions and compared the
answers received. For this, P stores a set of questions Qi and answers Ai at Bp as {Ep(Qi), Ep(Ai)}. The questions are
personal and known only to P. To authenticate P, Bp picks at random an Ep(Qi) and sends it to P at the store. P's anon-
ymous credit card decrypts the question and presents Qi to P. P answers it, the card encrypts it and sends Ep(Ai) to
BP for comparison with the stored encrypted answer. Depending on the amount of purchase, the bank may ask a dif-
ferent number of questions.
Protocol Speciﬁcation
[0026] In a preferred embodiment, a protocol implementing the invention consists of three distinct subprotocols. The
ﬁrst subprotocol is used when Bc 203 places credits into P's account at Bp 213. The second part is used during a pur-
chase in which the customer 231 requests Bp 213 to transfer funds to (Bs,S) 237. The third part is used when Bp sends
Bc a billing statement for the customer's purchases. The ﬁrst and third subprotocols are typically executed once every
billing period, while the second subprotocol is executed during every purchase.
[0027] As noted earlier, all messages are logged by cx 227 to provide an audit trail when dispute arises.
Subprotocol 1: Extension of credit (arrows 211, 223)
[0028]
1. Bc 203 sends cx 227 the signed message 305:
to place a credit δCR into (Bp, P) 217.
2. Bp 213 receives from cx 227 the message 309:
signed and guaranteed by cx 227.
3. Bp 213 increments P's credit by δCR.
[0029] The second subprotocol consists of two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, Bp 213 authenticates P 234 at the store
after receiving a transaction request. In the second phase, Bp 213 transfers funds to (Bs,S) 241.
m 1(B c,B p )=F B c (δ CR,D
e (B p,P ))
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Subprotocol 2: During purchase
Phase 1: Authentication of P (233, 405, 407)
[0030]
1. P 234 at store S 245 sends to cx 227 a message 303:
to request a transaction with Bp 213. Here,
δ is the amount of credit that P requests. PIN is the personal identiﬁcation number used to identify P to bank Bp.
De(Bs, S) is (the encrypted) S's account at Bs to be used by Bp for fund transfer. It is computed by P's anonymous
credit card from (Bs, S).
1 Ecx(S) is the encrypted address of the automatic cash register at S through which P and
Bp communicate. Ep(record) is a personal record P associates with the purchase to trace questionable purchases.
It can be decrypted only by P. It is sent to Bc by Bp with the bill at the end of a billing period (see below).
2. Bp 213 receives the message 309 from cx 227
signed by P 231 requesting a fund transfer.
Depending on the amount of the transaction, Bp may accept a PIN or may make one or more challenges in a
challenge-response phase described in steps 3-7 and shown in FIG. 4.
3. Conﬁrmation manager 403 in Bp 213 randomly selects a question from conﬁdential information 401 and sends
the question to P in a message 303 (arrow 405):
4. P 231 receives the message 307
Note that cx 227 appends
with a random number and encrypts it before forwarding, in order to break a link for collusion between Bp and on
S 245 that eavesdrops. Otherwise, if cx 227 simply forwards
then this message will serve for Bp and S that eavesdrops as a link unique to the transaction and allows them to
combine their information.
5. P sends the answer Ai to Bp in the message 303 (arrow 405):
1Note that even if , Bp cannot compare the received D
e(Bs, S) with precomputed encrypted addresses of all its
store customers in order to associate P with S. This is because a random number is appended before each encryption.
m 1(P ,B p )=F [X P (R ,B p ),B p ]
R =[δ,PIN ,D e (B s ,S ),E cx (S ),E p (record )]
B p = B s
m 2(P ,B p )=X P (R ,B p )
m 1(B p,P )=F [X B p (E p (Q i ),P ),E cx (S )]
m 2(B p,P )=X [X B p (E p (Q i ),P ,S ]
m1
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6. Bp receives the message 309
7. If P's answer is correct and if the account (Bp, P) has enough credit, Bp starts the fund-transfer phase.
Phase 2: Fund transfer
[0031]
8. Bp 213 sends cx 227 the signed message 305 (arrow 225)
αδ is the service charge to the store.
9. After verifying the banks Bp 213 and Bs 237 and the signature, cx 227 transfers the amount (1 - α)δ from Bp's
account to Bs's account at cx. It then sends Bs the message 309
signed and guaranteed by cx 227 (arrow 239).
10. On receiving m2(Bp, Bs), Bs sends a signed conﬁrmation of the transfer 303
to cx 227, which forwards it as
to S 245 (not shown in FIG. 2). S then releases the merchandise to P 231 (arrow 243).
[0032] At the end of a billing period, suppose P 231 has charged an amount ∆, and Bp 213 has given the amount (1
- α)∆ to stores' banks. Bp 213 has Bc's 203 guarantee to pay the debt, and it is Bc's responsibility to collect ∆ from C
231. By negotiation, the banks have agreed that Bp deserves a fraction β of the excess funds α∆ and Bc deserves 1 -
β of it. The following subprotocol is used to bill (Bc, C).
Subprotocol 3: Billing (Bc, C)
[0033]
1. Bp 213 sends cx 227 the signed message 303 (arrow 221)
Here,  is the amount Bp is requesting from Bc, and ∆ is the amount Bc should bill C.
Ep(record) is the encrypted itemized record of purchases generated by C's anonymous credit card. It can only be
decrypted by C.
2. After verifying Bp and Bc and the signature, cx 227 transfers the amount Rqst from Bc's account to Bp's account
at cx. It then sends Bc 203 the message 309 (arrow 209)
signed by cx 227.
[0034] Bc 203 sends C a bill for ∆ amount together with purchase record Ep(record) (arrow 207). If C challenges the
bill, there is a complete audit trail of messages 228 logged by cx 227. When C pays PAY amount, Bc extends PAY addi-
tional credit to (Bp, P) using subprotocol 1.
[0035] Other features of conventional credit cards can also be implemented. For instance, if the credit card is reported
m2
' (P ,B p )=X P (E p (A i ),B p )
m 1(B p ,B s )=F B p [(1-α)δ,D
e (B s ,S )]
m 2(B p,B s )=X cx [((1-α)δ,E B s (S )),B s ]
m 1(B s,S )=F [X B s (rcvd δ,S ),S ]
m 2(B s,S )=X B s (rcvd δ,S )
m 1(B p,B c )=F B p [(Rqst,E p (record )),D
e (B c,C )]
Rqst = (1 - (1 - β))α∆
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lost by C, Bc can use subprotocol 1 to reduce the credit in (Bp, P) to zero. The customer has the option of setting trig-
gers on account (Bp, P), so that Bp can use subprotocol 3 to notify the customer, through Bc, when abnormal spending
patterns are detected.
Collusion
[0036] One way in which the privacy of C 231 with regard to a transaction can be compromised is by collusion
between other parties to the transaction or between the communications exchange and one or more of the other par-
ties. By colluding, the parties can obtain information that is unavailable to them individually. For purposes of the present
discussion, C's privacy has been compromised with regard to a transaction if a party other than C knows C's identity
and the merchandise M or the store S or both.
[0037] The anonymous credit card protocols which have just been described are secure against collusion as follows:
• if cx 227 is trusted, no collusion among the banks and stores can compromise the customer.
• even if cx 227 is not trusted,
- if S 245 does not eavesdrop when C 231 communicates with Bp 213, then all parties and cx 227 have to col-
lude to associate C 231 with M.
- if S 245 does eavesdrop, then all players except cx 227 have to collude to associate C with M.
[0038] No collusion is possible if cx 227 is trusted because the random number included in every encryption ensures
that the source and destination of a message transfer cannot collude on the message content without ﬁrst colluding with
cx 227.
Simpliﬁed implementation: FIG. 5
[0039] There is a simpliﬁed implementation of the anonymous credit card transfer protocol which also has the kind of
security against collusion which was just described. The simpliﬁed implementation is shown in FIG. 5.
[0040] In simpliﬁed implementation 501, customer C 503 need maintain an account only at the card-issuing bank Bc
203. There is no longer any need for bank Bp 213, pseudonym P 234, or subprotocols 1 and 3. Instead, all that is
needed is a protocol which transfers funds from Bc 203 to Bs 237 during each purchase. The messages in the simpliﬁed
protocol appear as messages 505, 507, 509, and 511 in FIG. 5. As may be seen from FIG. 5, the messages are those
of subprotocol 2, except that all references to P and Bp are replaced by C and Bc, respectively.
[0041] Simpliﬁed implementation 501 presumes as did the original protocol that all communications are made via cx;
it is however also possible for C 503 to communicate directly with Bc 203, as shown by arrow 513. The message would
be the same as message 505, except that the destination Bc need not be speciﬁed to cx 227. We want to emphasize
that, even though the simpliﬁed implementation is as secure as the original protocol with regard to collusion, the original
protocol may offer additional protection not considered in our model. For instance, if each party independently decides
whether or not to collude, the customer using the original protocol may have a smaller chance of being compromised.
[0042] As simpliﬁed implementation 501 shows, what is required if C is both to remain anonymous with respect to the
transaction and to receive credit from Bc is the following:
• that Bc receive no readable information concerning the transaction beyond what it needs to extend credit;
• that Bs receives no information which it can read which associates M or S with C; and
• that Cx receive no information which it can read other than destinations for messages and fund transfers between
banks.
[0043] In the preferred embodiment, the above goal is attained by encrypting message 507 such that Bc 203 can read
the account number and the amount to be debited, but not the information relating to Bs 237 and such that cx 227 can
read only destinations. The system is further strengthened by having cx 227 remove those parts of the message not
needed at the destination. In other embodiments, cx 227 might disassemble message 505 and send only the part rel-
evant to Bc 203 to Bc 203 and after receiving an indication of approval from Bc 203, sending the part relevant to Bs 237
to Bs 237. In such an implementation, cx 227 would include an identifying tag with the message to Bc 203. The tag
would associate the message to Bc 203 with the message to Bs 237 and would be included by Bc 203 in the approval
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Conclusion
[0044] The foregoing Detailed Description has disclosed to those of ordinary skill in the art how an anonymous credit
card protocol may be employed to permit a credit card holder to make non-cash purchases of goods or services without
disclosing to the bank which issued the credit card what goods or services were purchased. The principles disclosed
with regard to the anonymous credit card protocol may be employed generally in situations where a transaction
between two parties requires that a third party vouch for the ability of one of the parties to make the transaction. Key
elements of the principles are the use of a communications exchange to pass information between the parties of the
transaction and the use of encrypted messages in which a party to the transaction or the communications exchange
can read only that information which is required for the party's or the information exchange's part in the transaction.
[0045] Not only may the principles disclosed herein be employed in areas other than credit card transactions, but as
has been shown by the two embodiments of anonymous credit card protocols disclosed herein, the principles may be
employed in many different forms of anonymous credit card protocols. Further, as will be apparent to those of ordinary
skill in the arts concerned, there are many different ways of actually implementing any such protocol. For example, the
preferred embodiments employ public key cryptography; however, any other technique which ensures that parties to a
transaction receive only the information which they require for the transaction will serve as well.
[0046] All of the above being the case, the foregoing Detailed Description is to be understood as being in every
respect illustrative and exemplary, but not restrictive, and the scope of the invention disclosed herein is not to be deter-
mined from the Detailed Description, but rather from the claims as interpreted with the full breadth permitted by the pat-
ent laws. is claimed is:
Claims
1. A method of making a transaction involving a ﬁrst party, a second party, and a third party which approves the trans-
action for the second party, the method being characterised by the steps of:
receiving a ﬁrst message in the third party which describes the transaction, the ﬁrst message containing ﬁrst
information about the transaction which is interpretable by the third party and which identiﬁes the ﬁrst party and
a transaction amount but does not identify the second party or the subject matter of the transaction and second
information about the transaction, the second information encrypted so as not to be interpretable by the third
party, containing no identiﬁcation of the ﬁrst party or the third party, and including third information identifying
the second party;
in the third party, responding to the ﬁrst message by determining whether the transaction is to be approved;
in the third party, sending a second message to a communications exchange, the second message indicating
whether the transaction has been approved and including the second information and the communications
exchange being able to read only the third information;
in the communications exchange, responding to the third information by sending a third message indicating
whether the transaction has been approved to the second party; and
in the second party, responding to the third message by dealing with the transaction with the ﬁrst party as indi-
cated by the third message.
2. A method as claimed in claim 1, wherein:
the second information further includes fourth information about the transaction which is interpretable by the
second party but not by the communications exchange; and
the step of responding to the third message includes the step of responding to the fourth information.
3. A method as claimed in claim 1 or 2, further comprising the steps of:
receiving a fourth message which includes the ﬁrst message and ﬁfth information identifying the third party
which is interpretable by the communications exchange; and
in the communications exchange, responding to the ﬁfth information by sending the ﬁrst message to the third
party.
4. A method as claimed in any one of claims 1, 2, or 3, further comprising the steps of:
encrypting the ﬁrst information so that the ﬁrst information is interpretable only by the third party;
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exchange; and
encrypting the second information other than the third information so that that information is interpretable only
by the second party.
5. A method as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein:
the ﬁrst party is identiﬁed to the third party by a pseudonym; and the method further includes the steps of:
in a fourth party which knows the ﬁrst party by an identiﬁer other than the pseudonym, receiving a ﬁfth mes-
sage which includes sixth information identifying the pseudonym and the third party, the information identifying
the pseudonym being interpretable by the third party but not the fourth party or the communications exchange
and the information identifying the third party being interpretable by the communications exchange but not the
fourth party;
in the fourth party, sending a sixth message to the communications exchange which includes the sixth informa-
tion and a credit amount which the third party is to credit to the ﬁrst party;
in the communications exchange, responding to the information identifying the third party by sending a seventh
message to the third party which includes the information identifying the pseudonym and the amount;
and wherein
the step responding to the ﬁrst message includes the steps of determining from the credit amount and the
transaction amount whether the transaction is to be approved.
6. A method as claimed in claim 5, further including the steps of:
in the third party, receiving an eighth message which includes seventh information identifying the ﬁrst party and
the fourth party, the information identifying the ﬁrst party being interpretable by the fourth party but not the third
party or the communications exchange and the information identifying the fourth party being interpretable by
the communications exchange but not the third party;
in the third party, sending a ninth message to the communications exchange which includes the seventh infor-
mation, and the transaction amount for at least one transaction;
in the communications exchange, responding to the information identifying the fourth party by sending a tenth
message to the fourth party which includes the information identifying the ﬁrst party and the transaction
amount; and
in the fourth party, responding to the tenth message by debiting the ﬁrst party for the transaction amount.
7. A method as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein:
the communications exchange further transfers funds between the second party and the third party;
the third information further includes the transaction amount; and the method includes the step performed in
the communications exchange of:
additionally responding to the third information by transferring an amount based on the transaction amount
from the second party to the third party.
8. A method as claimed in claim 7 wherein:
the steps of sending a third message includes the step of including the amount based on the transaction
amount in the third message, the amount based on the transaction amount being interpretable by the second
party.
9. A method as claimed in any preceding claim, further comprising the steps of:
receiving personal information in the third party from the ﬁrst party; and wherein
the second information includes eighth information by means of which the communications exchange can send
a message to the ﬁrst party and
the step of determining whether the transaction is to be approved includes the steps of
sending an eleventh message to the communications exchange which includes the eighth information and a
question based on the personal information, the question being interpretable only by the ﬁrst party,
in the communications exchange, sending a twelfth message to the ﬁrst party which contains the question,
in the communications exchange, receiving a thirteenth message from the ﬁrst party which contains an answer
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in the communications exchange, responding to the ﬁfth information by sending a fourteenth message to the
ﬁrst party which contains the answer; and
in the ﬁrst party, comparing the answer with the personal information and using the result of the comparison in
determining whether the transaction is to be approved.
10. A method as claimed in claim 9, and further including the step performed in the third party of:
determining whether the eleventh message is to be sent on the basis of the transaction amount.
11. A method as claimed in claim 10, wherein:
the step of determining whether the eleventh message is to be sent includes the step of determining whether
more than one eleventh message is to be sent.
Patentansprüche
1. Verfahren zur Herstellung einer Transaktion, die eine erste Partei, eine zweite Partei und eine dritte Partei einbe-
zieht, die die Transaktion für die zweite Partei annimmt, wobei das Verfahren durch die Schritte gekennzeichnet ist:
Empfangen einer ersten Nachricht in der dritten Partei, die die Transaktion beschreibt, wobei die erste Nach-
richt erste Informationen über die Transaktion, die von der dritten Partei interpretierbar ist, enthält, und die die
erste Partei und einen Transaktionsbetrag identiﬁziert, aber die zweite Partei oder den Gegenstand der Trans-
aktion nicht identiﬁziert, und zweite Informationen über die Transaktion enthält, wobei die zweiten Informatio-
nen verschlüsselt sind, so daß sie von der dritten Partei nicht interpretierbar sind, und die keine Identiﬁkation
der ersten Partei oder der dritten Partei enthält, und dritte Informationen enthält, die die zweite Partei identiﬁ-
zieren;
Antworten in der dritten Partei auf die erste Nachricht durch die Bestimmung ob die Transaktion angenommen
werden soll;
Senden einer zweiten Nachricht in der dritten Partei an einen Kommunikationsvermittler, wobei die zweite
Nachricht anzeigt, ob die Transaktion angenommen worden ist, und die zweiten Informationen und den Kom-
munikationsvermittler einschließt, der nur dazu imstande ist, die dritten Informationen zu lesen;
Antworten in dem Kommunikationsvermittler auf die dritten Informationen durch Senden einer dritten Nach-
richt, die anzeigt, ob die Transaktion an die zweite Partei angenommen wurde; und
Antworten in der zweiten Partei auf die dritte Nachricht durch Handeln mit der Transaktion mit der ersten Par-
tei, wie es durch die dritte Nachricht angezeigt wurde.
2. Verfahren, wie in Anspruch 1 beansprucht, wobei:
die zweiten Informationen weiter vierte Informationen über die Transaktion enthalten, die von der zweiten Par-
tei aber nicht von dem Kommunikationsvermittler interpretierbar sind; und
der Schritt auf die dritte Nachricht zu antworten den Schritt enthält, auf die vierten Informationen zu antworten.
3. Verfahren, wie in Anspruch 1 oder 2 beansprucht, weiter enthaltend die Schritte:
Empfangen einer vierten Nachricht, die die erste Nachricht und die dritte Partei identiﬁzierende fünfte Informa-
tionen enthält, die nur von dem Kommunikationsvermittler interpretierbar sind; und
Antworten in dem Kommunikationsvermittler auf die fünften Informationen durch Senden der ersten Nachricht
an die dritte Partei.
4. Verfahren wie nach irgendeinem der Ansprüche 1, 2 oder 3, weiter enthaltend die Schritte:
Verschlüsseln der ersten Informationen, so daß die ersten Informationen nur von der dritten Partei interpretier-
bar sind;
Verschlüsseln der dritten Informationen, so daß die dritten Informationen nur von dem Kommunikationsvermitt-
ler interpretierbar sind; und
Verschlüsseln der zweiten Informationen auf andere Weise als die dritten Informationen, so daß die Informa-
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5. Verfahren, wie in irgendeinem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche beansprucht, wobei:
die erste Partei an die dritte Partei durch ein Pseudonym identiﬁziert wird; und wobei das Verfahren weiter die
Schritte enthält:
Empfangen einer fünften Nachricht in einer vierten Partei, die die erste Partei durch einen Identiﬁzierer kennt,
der anders ist als das Pseudonym, wobei die fünfte Nachricht sechste Informationen enthält, die das Pseud-
onym und die dritte Partei identiﬁzieren, wobei die Informationen, die das Pseudonym identiﬁzieren, von der
dritten Partei aber nicht der vierten Partei oder dem Kommunikationsvermittler interpretierbar sind, und die die
dritte Partei identiﬁzierenden Informationen von dem Kommunikationsvermittler aber nicht von der vierten Par-
tei interpretierbar sind;
Senden in der vierten Partei einer sechsten Nachricht an den Kommunikationsvermittler, die die sechsten
Informationen und einen Kreditbetrag enthalten, die die dritte Partei der ersten Partei gewähren soll;
Antworten in dem Kommunikationsvermittler auf die die dritte Partei identiﬁzierenden Informationen durch
Senden einer siebenten Nachricht an die dritte Partei, die die das Pseudonym und den Betrag identiﬁzieren-
den Informationen enthält;
und wobei:
der Schritt, auf die erste Nachricht zu antworten, den Schritt enthält, von dem Kreditbetrag und dem Transak-
tionsbetrag her zu bestimmen, ob die Transaktion angenommen werden soll.
6. Verfahren, wie in Anspruch 5 beansprucht, weiter enthaltend die Schritte:
Empfangen einer achten Nachricht in der dritten Partei, die die erste Partei und die vierte Partei identiﬁzieren-
den Informationen enthält, wobei die die erste Partei identiﬁzierenden Informationen von der vierten Partei
aber nicht von der dritten Partei oder dem Kommunikationsvermittler interpretierbar sind, und die die vierte
Partei identiﬁzierenden Informationen von dem Kommunikationsvermittler aber nicht von der dritten Partei
interpretierbar sind;
Senden einer neunten Nachricht in der dritten Partei an den Kommunikationsvermittler, die die siebenten Infor-
mationen und den Transaktionsbetrag für wenigstens eine Transaktion enthält;
Antworten in dem Kommunikationsvermittler auf die die vierte Partei identiﬁzierenden Informationen durch
Senden einer zehnten Nachricht an die vierte Partei, die die erste Partei identiﬁzierenden Informationen und
den Transaktionsbetrag enthält; und
Antworten in der vierten Partei auf die zehnte Nachricht durch Belasten der ersten Partei um den Transakti-
onsbetrag.
7. Verfahren, wie in irgendeinem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche beansprucht, wobei:
der Kommunikationsvermittler darüber hinaus Gelder zwischen der zweiten Partei und der dritten Partei trans-
feriert;
die dritten Informationen darüber hinaus den Transaktionsbetrag enthalten; und das Verfahren den in dem
Kommunikationsvermittler durchgeführten Schritt enthält:
zusätzlich auf die dritten Informationen durch Transferieren eines Betrags zu antworten, der auf dem Transak-
tionsbetrag von der zweiten Partei an die dritte Partei basiert ist.
8. Verfahren, wie in Anspruch 7 beansprucht, wobei:
die Schritte, eine dritte Nachricht zu senden, den Schritt enthält, den auf dem Transaktionsbetrag basierten
Betrag in die dritte Nachricht einzuschließen, wobei der auf dem Transaktionsbetrag basierte Betrag von der
zweiten Partei interpretierbar ist.
9. Verfahren, wie in irgendeinem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche beansprucht, weiter enthaltend die Schritte:
Empfangen von persönlichen Informationen in der dritten Partei von der ersten Partei;
und wobei:
die zweiten Informationen achte Informationen enthalten, mittels derer der Kommunikationsvermittler eine
Nachricht an die erste Partei senden kann; und
der Schritt, zu entscheiden, ob die Transaktion angenommen werden soll die Schritte enthält:
Senden einer elften Nachricht an den Kommunikationsvermittler, die die achten Informationen und eine auf
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bar ist;
Senden einer zwölften Nachricht in dem Kommunikationsvermittler an die erste Partei, die die Frage enthält;
Empfangen einer drei zehnten Nachricht in dem Kommunikationsvermittler von der ersten Partei, die eine Ant-
wort auf die Frage enthält, die nur von der dritten Partei interpretierbar ist;
Antworten in dem Kommunikationsvermittler auf die fünften Informationen durch Senden einer vierzehnten
Nachricht an die erste Partei, die die Antwort enthält; und
Vergleichen der Antwort mit den persönlichen Informationen in der ersten Partei und Verwenden des Ergeb-
nisses des Vergleichs bei der Bestimmung, ob die Transaktion angenommen werden soll.
10. Verfahren, wie in Anspruch 9 beansprucht, und weiter den in der dritten Partei durchgeführten Schritt enthaltend:
zu bestimmen, ob die elfte Nachricht auf der Basis des Transaktionsbetrags gesendet werden soll.
11. Verfahren wie in Anspruch 10 beansprucht, wobei:
der Schritt zu bestimmen, ob die elfte Nachricht gesendet werden soll, den Schritt enthält, zu bestimmen, ob
mehr als eine elfte Nachricht gesendet werden soll.
Revendications
1. Procédé de réalisation d'une transaction mettant en jeu une première partie, une deuxième partie et une troisième
partie qui approuve la transaction pour la deuxième partie, le procédé étant caractérisé par les étapes de:
réception d'un premier message au niveau de la troisième partie qui décrit la transaction, le premier message
contenant une première information concernant la transaction qui peut être interprétée par la troisième partie
et qui identiﬁe la première partie et un montant de transaction mais qui n'identiﬁe pas la deuxième partie ou
l'objet de la transaction et une deuxième information concernant la transaction, la deuxième information étant
cryptée de manière à ne pas pouvoir être interprétée par la troisième partie, ne contenant pas d'identiﬁcation
de la première partie ou de la troisième partie, et incluant une troisième information qui identiﬁe la deuxième
partie;
au niveau de la troisième partie, réponse au premier message en déterminant si la transaction doit être
approuvée;
au niveau de la troisième partie, envoi d'un deuxième message à un central de communication, le deuxième
message indiquant si la transaction a été approuvée et incluant la deuxième information et le central de com-
munication pouvant lire seulement la troisième information;
au niveau du central de communication, réponse à la troisième information en envoyant un troisième message
indiquant si la transaction a été approuvée pour la deuxième partie; et
au niveau de la deuxième partie, réponse au troisième message en concluant la transaction avec la première
partie comme indiqué par le troisième message.
2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel:
la deuxième information inclut en outre une quatrième information concernant la transaction qui peut être inter-
prétée par la deuxième partie mais pas par le central de communication; et
l'étape de réponse au troisième message inclut l'étape de réponse à la quatrième information.
3. Procédé selon la revendication 1 ou 2, comprenant en outre les étapes de:
réception d'un quatrième message qui inclut le premier message et une cinquième information qui identiﬁe la
troisième partie et qui peut être interprétée par le central de communication; et
au niveau du central de communication, réponse à la cinquième information en envoyant le premier message
à la troisième partie.
4. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1, 2 ou 3, comprenant en outre les étapes de:
cryptage de la première information de telle sorte que la première information puisse être interprétée seule-
ment par la troisième partie;
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ment par le central de communication; et
cryptage de la deuxième information autre que la troisième information de telle sorte que cette information
puisse être interprétée seulement par la deuxième partie.
5. Procédé sel on l'une quel conque des revendications précédentes, dans lequel:
la première partie est identiﬁée pour la troisième partie au moyen d'un pseudonyme; et le procédé inclut en
outre les étapes de:
au niveau d'une quatrième partie qui connaît la première partie au moyen d'un identiﬁcateur autre que le pseu-
donyme, réception d'un cinquième message qui inclut une sixième information qui identiﬁe le pseudonyme et
la troisième partie, l'information qui identiﬁe le pseudonyme pouvant être interprétée par la troisième partie
mais pas par la quatrième partie ou par le central de communication et l'information qui identiﬁe la troisième
partie pouvant être interprétée par le central de communication mais pas par la quatrième partie;
au niveau de la quatrième partie, envoi d'un sixième message au central de communication, lequel inclut la
sixième information et un montant de crédit que la troisième partie doit créditer à la première partie;
au niveau du central de communication, réponse à l'information qui identiﬁe la troisième partie en envoyant un
septième message à la troisième partie, lequel inclut l'information qui identiﬁe le pseudonyme et le montant; et
dans lequel:
l'étape de réponse au premier message inclut les étapes de détermination, à partir du montant de crédit et du
montant de transaction, de si la transaction doit être approuvée.
6. Procédé selon la revendication 5, incluant en outre les étapes de:
au niveau de la troisième partie, réception d'un huitième message qui inclut une septième information qui iden-
tiﬁe la troisième partie et la quatrième partie, l'information qui identiﬁe la première partie pouvant être interpré-
tée par la quatrième partie mais pas par la troisième partie ou par le central de communication et l'information
qui identiﬁe la quatrième partie pouvant être interprétée par le central de communication mais pas par la troi-
sième partie;
au niveau de la troisième partie, envoi d'un neuvième message au central de communication, lequel inclut la
septième information et le montant de transaction pour au moins une transaction;
au niveau du central de communication, réponse à l'information qui identiﬁe la quatrième partie en envoyant
un dixième message à la quatrième partie, lequel inclut l'information qui identiﬁe la première partie et le mon-
tant de transaction; et
au niveau de la quatrième partie, réponse au dixième message en débitant la première partie du montant de
la transaction.
7. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, dans lequel:
le central de communication transfère en outre des fonds entre la deuxième partie et la troisième partie;
la troisième information inclut en outre le montant de transaction; et le procédé inclut l'étape réalisée dans le
central de communication qui consiste à:
répondre additionnellement à la troisième information en transférant un montant sur la base du montant de
transaction depuis la deuxième partie jusqu'à la troisième partie.
8. Procédé selon la revendication 7, dans lequel:
l'étape d'envoi d'un troisième message inclut l'étape consistant à inclure le montant qui est basé sur le montant
de transaction dans le troisième message, le montant qui est basé sur le montant de transaction pouvant être
interprété par la deuxième partie.
9. Procédé sel on l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, comprenant en outre les étapes de:
réception d'une information personnelle au niveau de la troisième partie en provenance de la première partie;
et
dans lequel:
la deuxième information inclut une huitième information au moyen de laquelle le central de communication
peut envoyer un message à la première partie; et
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envoi d'un onzième message au central de communication, lequel inclut la huitième information et une ques-
tion qui est basée sur l'information personnelle, la question pouvant être interprétée seulement par la première
partie;
au niveau du central de communication, envoi d'un douzième message à la première partie, lequel contient la
question;
au niveau du central de communication, réception d'un treizième message en provenance de la première par-
tie, lequel contient une réponse à la question qui peut être interprétée seulement par la troisième partie;
au niveau du central de communication, réponse à la cinquième information en envoyant un quatorzième mes-
sage à la première partie, lequel contient la réponse; et
au niveau de la première partie, comparaison de la réponse avec l'information personnelle et utilisation du
résultat de la comparaison lors de la détermination de si la transaction doit être approuvée.
10. Procédé selon la revendication 9, et incluant en outre l'étape réalisée au niveau de la troisième partie consistant à:
déterminer si le onzième message doit être envoyé sur la base du montant de transaction.
11. Procédé selon la revendication 10, dans lequel:
l'étape de détermination de si le onzième message doit être envoyé inclut l'étape de détermination de si plus
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